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INTRODUCTION
The goal of cognitive psychology is to provide a general understanding of human
cognitive processes through the development of general , formal models of cognition . Although it is clearl y true that some areas (such as memory) have been
more highly developed than others, it is undeniable that cognitive psychology
has witnessed a proliferation of models in the past decade. Perhaps researchers
are find ing it increasingly difficult to discriminate among competing memory
models because the constraints are so weak. One possibility that will be explored
in this chapter is the prospect of using multidimensional scaling (MDS) and
related procedures as a means of providing constraint for theorizing .
In this chapter, we initially provide a brief description of the problem of the
inability to distinguish among models . Subsequently, we sketch some scaling
and clustering procedures. We then discuss a number of applications of MDS and
related procedures to domains of interest to cognitive psychologists . Particul ar
attention is given to the constraint provided by these techniques on cognitive
theorizing. Subsequently , we outline how one might choose the correct procedure and how one might circumvent some problems raised by using these
procedures to study cognitive domains . Next , we provide a brief application of
these procedures to the domain of cognitive psychology models . Finall y, we
attempt to provide an assessment of the utility of MDS and related procedures in
cognitive psychology.
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DISTINGUISHING THEORIES: AN ILLU STRATIVE
EXAMPLE
One particularly salient example of the difficulty in telling seemingly contradictory theories apart is the recent dispute over the viability of the semantic/episodic
distinction in human memory. Briefly, Tulving (1983) has proposed that the
human memory system can profitably be divided into memory for general world
knowledge (semantic) and memory for personal events (episodic). In contrast,
other theorists have claimed that a unitary theory of memory provides a better
account (Anderson & Ross, 1980; McKoon, Ratcliff, & Dell, in press).
It would certainly seem that two theoretical viewpoints that differ in the
desirability of partitioning the memory system along such fundamental lines
should be easy to tell apart. In fact, this goal has proven elusive. To date, the
most conclusive kind of evidence on this issue is the dissociation experiment in
which one examines the effects of an independent variable on an episodic memory task and a semantic one. If we find that the variable has different effects on the
two tasks, then according to Tulving (1983) we have evidence for the distinction.
Although one might reasonably believe that these dissociation experiments
might resolve this issue, they have not. Proponents of a unitary view argue that
when the task changes it is often necessary for the cognitive operations to change
also and consequently we should expect these kinds of dissociations. More
explicitly, the confusion over the semantic/episodic distinction can best be understood in terms of the distinction between structure and process in cognitive
psychology. Basically, any model must specify a set of structural assumptions
and a set of processing assumptions. The problem is that whereas one set of
assumptions might nicely account for some set of data, it is also the case that a
very different set of structural assumptions, usually accompanied by a very
different set of processing assumptions, can also account for the same set of data.
Compounding the problem is that many models are not sufficiently detailed as to
have both an explicit set of structural assumptions and an explicit set of processing assumptions.
In the case of the semantic/episodic distinction, both problems are operative.
Proponents of the distinction explain the dissociation by appealing to the different memory structures involved. Unitary theorists claim that different tasks will
necessarily involve some different processes and therefore dissociations are far
from unequivocal evidence for a structural distinction. Without explicit processing assumptions, it is impossible to determine who has the stronger claim.
One obvious solution to this problem is to require our theorizing to be more
precise. McKoon, Ratcliff, and Dell (in press) have made this suggestion quite
eloquently and have also proposed a somewhat more detailed version of the
unitary theory. However, it would be naive of us to suppose that precision in
theorizing will naturally occur because vagueness leads to problems in telling
theories apart. What is needed are techniques that enable us to develop more

7.

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN COGN ITI VE PSYCHOLOGY

231

detailed theories. One possibility is any technique that provides some constraint
on structure. Although it is not immediately obvious to us that multidimensional
scaling will help with making these accounts of the semantic/episodic distinction
more distinguishable , we do believe that multidimensional scaling and kindred
procedures may, in general, provide this very necessary kind of constraint.
One typically uses MDS to obtain a structural representation of a stimulus
domain. It will not provide a process model, although the structure recovered
may suggest one. One way to examine the claim that MDS will provide constraint to cognitive theories is to examine some previous uses of the method to
determine if its use has provided any constraint on theorizing in the area of
application.

KINDS OF MDS AND RELATED PROCEDURES
Before examining the applications of MDS in cognitive psychology, it is useful
to make some preliminary distinctions among procedures that correspond to
conceptual differences among applications. The most important differences are
whether the recovered representation is continuous or discrete and whether individual differences are taken into account.
Carroll and Arabie (1980), in their review of multidimensional scaling propose a detailed taxonomy of MDS methods, of which only a portion will be used
here. Two-way MDS is the oldest of these procedures. Originally developed by
Shepard (l962a, 1962b) and Kruskal (l964a , 1964b), the original program has
evolved considerably over the last 2 decades. In the most modern version,
KYST, the input data are a matrix of proximities in which the rows and columns
of the matrix represent stimulus objects. KYST uses this type of input matrix that
contains the similarity (or dissimilarity) of each object to each other object. The
output of the procedure is a graphical depiction of the stimulus objects in k
dimensions. In contrast to this continuous measure , there are also discrete twoway procedures. One of the most promising is MAPCLUS, the Arabie and
Carroll (1980) algorithm for fitting the Shepard-Arabie ADCLUS (1979) model.
This procedure takes the same input data as KYST and returns a solution of k
clusters of stimulus objects with a cluster weight (and an additive constant).
Goodness-of-fit is measured somewhat differently in the two procedures:
MAPCLUS provides variance accounted for whereas KYST reports STRESS, a
badness-of-fit measure.
A similar classification can be made of three-way procedures , which take
individual differences I into account. These procedures all take an input matrix
IStrictly speaking, the third " way " need not be variation among individua ls; it may instead be
differences in groups of people or stimu lus context, but the most common use is individua ls. We
employ the most common use here because it is easier to understand .
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whose rows and columns represent stimu lus objects, as in the two-way matrix ,
but whose extra third dimension represents individuals. Conceptually , one can
think of this matrix as a series of two-way matrices where each individual
contributes one two-way matrix. The most common three-way analogue to
KYST is INDSCAL, developed by Carroll and Chang (1970), or its fasterrunning successor SINDSCAL (Pruzansky, 1975). Like KYST, INDSCAL outputs a spatial representation of the stimulus objects in k dimensions. However, in
addition to this object space , INDSCAL also provides a subject space, a plot of
the weight that each subject assigns to each dimension.
For discrete models, Arabie and Carroll (1983) have developed an individual
differences variant of MAPCLUS named INDCLUS. This procedure takes a
three-way matrix of proximities (exactly as in SINDSCAL) and outputs k clusters where each cluster contains elements of the stimulus domain, but INDCLUS
also provides a cluster weighting for each individual subject. Thus, just as
INDSCAL provided a weighting for each subject on each dimension, so too
INDCLUS provides a weighting for each subject on each cluster.
Generally speak ing, researchers have employed two-way models when they
sought to describe a stimulus structure that was assumed to be common to all
individuals and a three-way method when the underlying representation was
assumed to vary across individuals. There have been two types of exceptions to
this rule. First, because three-way methods can often extract higher dimensionality , some investigators have employed these methods even when variation over
individuals was not an issue. Second, there have been several creative uses of
three-way methods in which the third way was not individuals , but some other
factor, such as age of the particular group of subjects (in developmental studies)
or context. Third, three-way methods yield unique orientation of axes, while the
axes provided by the two-way methods are usually arbitrary, and so are subject to
rotation.

MDS AS A METHOD FOR DETERMINING STRUCTURE
Much of the early work in cognitive psychology that used MDS did so exclusively for descriptive purposes. For examp le, in one of the largest collections
of scaling work,Fillenbaum and Rappaport (1971) used a precursor of KYST to
scale a large number of semantic terms ranging from verbs to classes of nouns.
Similarly , Clark (1968) scaled a large number of common prepositions. After
presenting the graphic solution , the main problem remaining was to label the
dimensions . Although we discuss some solutions to this problem below, the
standard of 15 years ago was simply to examine the dimensions and label them
intuitively . Even under these relatively relaxed standards, it is clear that some of
this research was quite fruitful.
One of the most widely analyzed data sets is the confusion matrices collected
by Miller and Nicely (1955) on consonant phonemes. Shepard (1972) incorporat-
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ed the idea of fitting an exponential decay function on the original confusion
proportions before performing the MDS analysis. He recovered a two-dimensional solution in which the first dimension distinguished voiced phonemes (za
and da) from unvoiced ones (fa and ka). The second dimension separated the
nasals (ma and na) from the other consonant phonemes. Within these remaining
phonemes, there was also a separation between those that are formed at the front
of the mouth (fa and ba) and those that are formed at the rear (ga and zha). These
results thus gave considerable support to the featural interpretation of consonant
phonemes.
The color domain has also been of long-standing interest to users of MDS
(Ekman, 1954). In fact, color was the primary example that Shepard used in his
original paper (1962a). Using the judged similarity of the common color names,
Shepard found that the data were well fit by a two-dimensional solution in which
the names were arranged in a color circle in which there was a gap between the
color with shortest wavelength (violet) and the one with the longest wavelength
(red). In the circle, the points are arranged in terms of their wavelength, such that
connecting the points in the circle orders the colors monotonically in terms of
their wavelength. In addition, the fact that red and violet are quite close to each
other (even though they are maximally different in wavelength) accords quite
well with our intuition that these colors are psychologically quite similar.

Semantic. In contrast to the perceptual and sensory domains, the results of
using MDS with semantic domains are generally less clear-cut. There are several
possible reasons why the results of MDS analysis are not always salutary with
this kind of domain. First, it is the case that most semantic domains are of
functionally infinite size (although there are exceptions to this general principle,
such as kin terms and Engli sh prepositions). Thus, some selection of exemplars
from a domain must be made , and, somewhat surprisingly , this selection is often
done haphazardly. Different subsets will yield different results . Second, the
meaning of various terms can change with the context. This change can be either
a function of homonyms or some more subtle change. For a subtle change, the
meaning of eagle may be different in the context of other birds than is its
meaning in the context of other predators. For a radical change the location of bat
in a multidimensional space is going to be different if bat is among other rodents
or among other types of sporting equipment. We discuss context effects in
greater detail in a later section. Third , semantic domains are potentiall y more
heterogeneous than other domains we have considered. Thus, while all color
names can be compared on hue, brightness, and saturation, it is difficult to
imagine even a single dimension on which one could relate drunkenness, lion,
and chair. Fourth, some semantic domains, such as categories, that are frequently subjected to MDS analysis may pose technical problems for many of the
MDS programs that are presently used. We discuss this issue in a later section .
One of the most commonly scaled semantic domains is categories and one of
the most commonly scaled categories is animals. Beginning with Henley (1969),
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there have been a number of MDS analyses of this particular domain. Henley
presented a three-dimensional solution in which the first dimension ordered the
animals along the continuum of size. The second dimension, which Henley
(1969) labeled ferocity had predators at one pole and domesticated animals at the
other. The third dimension was largely uninterpretable. It did seem to set off the
anthropoid apes from the other animals, and perhaps for this reason, Henley
elected to label it as humanness. However, relatively intelligent animals like the
elephant ranked near the bottom of this dimension, and it thus seems that a just
conclusion is that this third dimension is uninterpretable.
There has been minor controversy over how many dimensions are appropriate
for this domain. Using INDSCAL, Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) obtained a
satisfactory fit to their data in two dimensions, which they labeled size and
predacity. Their second dimension was much like Henley's in that it separated
the predators from the farm animals; they felt that ferocity was misleading and
therefore employed the obscure term predacity. In addition to the satisfactory fit
that Rips et al. (1973) obtained, they also were able to use the distances obtained
from the solution to predict categorization latencies. Generally speaking, exemplars that were further in the space from the category label took longer to
categorize. Shoben (1976) also found that mammals could be fit in these same
two dimensions, although he used only 6 mammal exemplars and 6 bird exemplars. Many other researchers have been unable to obtain an adequate fit without
going to a largely uninterpretable third dimension. For example, King , Gruenewald, and Lockhead (1978) argued for a three-dimensional solution, and
Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) were unable to use the distances from a twodimensional solution to generate predictions in an analogies task where distances
obtained from a three-dimensional solution provided a very good fit.
Although the results using animal names are certainly not definitive, the
results are at least interpretable in terms of plausible, denotative, semantic dimensions. There are many examples to the contrary, and the number extant in the
literature probably understates the number of failures considerably because of the
difficulty in publishing negative results . Often these negative results are mentioned in a context with results that are more heartwarming to the author. For
example, Shoben (1976) was unable to interpret a solution he obtained for fruits
and vegetables. Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982) report a number of
scalings in which the first author was involved, and none of those solutions had
readily interpretable dimensions.
Semantic stimuli that are heterogeneous present a different problem. The
resulting solution is often interpretable, but usually in terms of connotative
dimensions. One example is a study by Arnold (1971) in which his heterogeneous group of concrete and abstract nouns yielded a three-dimensional solution that included the dimensions evaluation, potency , and activation (Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1954). In large measure, such an outcome makes sense
because it is highly unlikely that a heterogeneous group of objects will have
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common denotative dimensions. The only common dimensions for such a collection are the connotative attributes.

APPLICATIONS OF MDS TO COGNITIVE TASKS
Although early applications of MDS often took the solution as the end result,
some later applications have attempted to use the resulting solution to predict
behavior. Rips et al. (1973), for example, used the distances between the exemplars of a category and the category name to predict latencies in a categorization
task. In a reaction time (RT) task, subjects were asked to decide if, for example,
a duck was a bird. Rips et al. (1973) found that the time to make this judgment
could be predicted quite well by the distance between duck and bird in the
multidimensional space produced by INDSCAL.
Shoben (1976) extended this technique in a same-different task. He assumed
that short distances should facilitate positive judgments and inhibit negative
ones. Shoben used the derived distances to predict both same and different
latencies in a task where subjects were presented with pairs of exemplars and
decided if the exemplars were from same or different categories. Thus, the
correct answer is same for goose-chicken and different for goose-bear. For same
responses, Shoben (1976) found that the distance between each exemplar and the
category name contributed significantly to the prediction of Same RT. Interestingly, and in contrast to processing accounts espoused by Schaeffer and
Wallace (\ 970) , the distance between the two exemplars had no effect on latency . In a similar way, the distance between the exemplar and the category name
also predicted Different RT. Not surprisingly, the distance between the first
exemplar and its true category contributed significantly to RT. Somewhat less
obviously, the distance between the second exemplar and the first category also
contributed significantly to RT . Once again , the distance between the two exemplars had no effect. Let us consider the pairs bear-goose and bear-robin. For
both pairs , bear is quite close to its superordinate mammal so this aspect of the
decision should be quite easy . However, robin and goose vary in their proximity
to the superordinate mammal. For a bird exemplar, goose is quite close , while
robin is quite distant. Consequently, we expect bear-goose to be more difficult
than bear-robin.

MDS RESULTS AS A SOURCE OF PROCESSING
EXPLANATIONS
From the regression analyses described above , Shoben (1976) came up with a
processing account of performance in the same-different task . He assumed that
subjects processed the exemplars sequentially and he presented evidence that
people did indeed follow his admonition to read the first word first. Subjects then
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categorized the first exemplar and the difficulty in performing this operation was
a function of the distance between this exemp lar and its category name. Subsequently, subjects compared the second exemplar to the category determined in
the preceding operation. Here, increasing distance made it more difficult to
conclude that the second exemplar was a member of the category, but increasing
distance made a negative decision easier. This model thus provides a satisfactory
account of performance in a same-different task, and seriously questions the
processing explanation offered previously by Schaeffer and Wallace (1970).
Although Shoben (1976) used the MDS analysis to help devise an information
processing account of a cognitive task, there are more formal accounts that are
tied to scaling data more closely. In particular, the Rumelhart and Abrahamsen
(1973) model of analogy is an excellent example. Although more sophisticated
theories of analogical reasoning are now avai lable (Sternberg, 1977), Rumelhart
and Abrahamsen's theory is one of the best examples of a formal theory derived
in large part from MDS analysis .
The task employed by Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) was a 4-term analogy problem. Subjects solved analogies such as fox:horse::chipmunk: _ _ . They
selected the best alternative (in one experiment) from a list of four alternatives: in
this example, antelope, donkey, elephant, and wo lf, where elephant is the best
answer in this case. In spatial terms, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) noted
that the ideal point could be determined by constructing a parallelogram given
the three vertices specified by the three given terms of the analogy. In other
words, one must determine the relationship between the first two terms of the
analogy and then apply those relationships to the third term to determine the ideal
point. In this domain (animal names) , one must determine these relationships in
all three dimensions. For the present example, fox is smaller than horse , somewhat more ferocio us than horse, and sli ghtly less human than horse. The ideal
point is thus :"rger than a chipmunk , less ferocious than chipmunk , and sli ghtly
more hurr an than chipmunk. Elephant is the closest of the four alternatives to
this ideal. It shou ld also be noted that one can rank order the alternatives in terms
of proximity to the ideal, as Rumelhart and Abrahamsen did, and one finds that
antelope is the second-best completion, donkey is third, and wolf is last.
In additi on to predicting subjects' so lutions, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen
(1 973) also leveloped a theory to account for the distribution of responses. They
assumed that subjects ' choices would be in proportion to their distances from the
ideal point. More formally, they suggested that the distribution of responses
would follow Luce's (1959) choice rule.

x )=

'n

n

2:

v(dJ

(1)

v(d j )

j

Here , d i = X i - 1: the distance between alternative Xi and the ideal point, and
v ( ) is a monotonically decreasing function and p(Xi lX l ' . . . ,X n ) is the proba-
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bility of selecting the ith item from the n alternatives. Because Shepard (1972)
had obtained good fits to recall data by using an exponential decay function,
Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) assumed that vex) = exp (- ax) where a is
constrained to be positive.
Using this one parameter, Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) were able to
obtain good fits to the data at both a quantitative and a qualitative level. Even the
data for the third and fourth choices show a strikingly good fit. Moreover, this
high level of correspondence was invariant when the distances among the alternatives was varied.
The work of Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) is an excellent example of
how MDS analysis can lead to a formal processing model. The ability to determine the distances of the alternatives from the ideal was an important prerequisite to the application of Luce's choice rule.

MDS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SEMANTIC MEMORY
Although MDS analysis has certainly proven useful in a number of cases, to what
degree are semantic memory models constrained by MDS results? Viewed most
negatively, the answer is that MDS analysis has not provided much of a constraint on semantic memory theorizing. Some theorists (Collins & Loftus, 1975)
argue that the appropriate metaphor for semantic memory is a network, while
others have argued that a set-theoretic account is more appropriate (McCloskey
& Glucksberg, 1979). From the perspective of the categorization literature, such
fundamental questions as whether prototype models or exemplar models are
more appropriate remains an open question (Smith & Medin, 1981) . From this
account, it seems clear that MDS analysis (or any other kind of analysis) has
provided relatively little constraint on theorizing in semantic memory.
However, viewed most positively , MDS has provided considerable constraint. From the work just reviewed, it is clear that there is structure in semantic
memory that any model must account for, and that that structure is based on
meaning. If, for example, we are interested in the processing of analogies, then ,
on the basis of Rumelhart and Abrahamsen's (1973) work, we must take into
account the simi larity in meaning as indicated by the three dimensions derived
from Henley's (1969) original scaling of animal names . Although it is correct
that this analysis does not specify what form the "correct" model of semantic
memory shou ld take, it does specify an important constraint of which any viable
model must take notice. Th is evidence for dimensional processing, for example,
is more readily incorporated into set-theoretic accounts than it is into network
accounts.
Thus, judging from the semantic memory literature , it is important that the
amount of constraint provided by MDS analysis not be oversold . The power to
distinguish among broad classes of models is not in the power of the method. In
fact, it appears to provide very little in the way of processing constraint. It does,
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however, provide some index of structure for which any reasonable model must
account.

MUSIC PERCEPTION

The area of music perception is a rapidly growing and exciting field within
cognitive psychology. Most of the advance has been within the past 6 years and it
has been largely concerned with the psychological structure of music. Given this
structural emphasis, it is not surprising that the contribution of MDS analysis has
been large.
Early work in music perception was largely sensory and focused principally
on pitch height (Stevens & Volkmann, 1940). Subsequent work (Shepard , 1964)
has indicated a more complicated structure that is characterized by its emphasis
on the octave. According to this account, the notes of a musical scale are
properly thought of in terms of a chroma circle , analogous to the color circle
discussed earlier.
The more recent work on music perception differs from the earlier studies by
using an explicit musical context. From the subject's perspective, the more
recent studies are examining the perception of music rather than the perception of
tones. Some recent studies, for example, have asked subjects to judge the similarity of two tones in the context of a diatonic scale or to judge the similarity of
two passages in the context of a melody. The use of richer context has enabled
experimenters to recover (using MDS analyses) much more complicated structures.
Perhaps the seminal work of these studies has been performed by Krumhansl
(1979). She presented subjects with a variety of musical contexts: a major chord
triad, an ascending major scale, or a descending major scale. Subjects in each of
these context conditions rated the similarity of a pair of tones in the context.
Differences among these three contexts were slight. Looking first at the raw
similarity measures, some very regular results emerge. First, for stimuli in the
major triad, other tones in the triad were judged most similar. Diatonic tones
were judged next similar, followed by nondiatonics. For the diatonic tones (those
not in the major triad) , the same pattern was observed. For the nondiatonics ,
there was little effect of this categorical variable; whether a particular tone was
diatonic or nondiatonic mattered little. Pitch height was the primary determinant
of similarity between a nondiatonic tone and another tone .
The MDS representation that Krumhansl (1979) obtained is a complicated
variant of the chroma circle. In her three-dimensional solution one can see the
richness captured by the MDS analysis. The structure resembles an inverted
cone. The components of the major triad form the base of the cone. For the C
major scale she employed, these components are C, E, G, and high C, reading
clockwise around the circle. At the next level are the diatonic tones. Reading
clockwise around the circle at this level, we find D, F, A, and B. Finally, at the
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base of the inverted cone (the circle with the largest diameter) we find the
nondiatonic tones. Like the tones at the other two levels, the tones are arranged
in ascending order if one reads them in a clockwise order.
Thus it appears that more than a chroma circle emerges when tones are
presented in a musical context. Even subjects who had little or no musical
training classified tones in the fashion suggested by music theory. Here we have
a case where it is difficult to think of a method other than MDS that might have
been able to recover this structure.
Krumhansl and her colleagues (Krumhansl, Bharucha, & Kessler, 1982) have
generalized this result from tones to chords . In the context of a C major scale, for
example, Krumhansl et al. (1982) demonstrated that the major chords (CEG,
FAC, and GBD) were central in an MDS representation. For a minor key
(Krumhansl et al. used A minor), the corresponding chords were A minor 0
minor, and E major, respectively. Chords that were not a part of the scale
sequence were at the periphery of the space.
More recently, Pollard-Gott (1983) has used MDS analysis to examine the
perception of passages of classical music. She had subjects listen repeatedly to a
Liszt sonata. Pollard-Gott encouraged her subjects to listen carefully and to take
notes . At the end of each session, she gave 28 pairs of stimuli that were constructed from the eight passages from the sonata that she selected. The passages
varied in length from 4 to 16 measures.
The similarities were analyzed using SINDSCAL (Carroll & Chang, 1970;
Pruzansky, 1975). The data are particularly interesting when examined across
sessions. The dimensions extracted, for example, progress from relatively naive
and unsophisticated distinctions in the first sessions to a fairly sophisticated one
in the final session . More specifically, the dimensions recovered from the similarities obtained after the first session reflected fairly gross physical features of
the passages: happy-sad, high-low, simple-complex, and loud-soft. After the
second session, however, the more sophisticated dimension of theme emerges .
Here, this dimension separates, without any overlap, passages that deal with
theme A from those that deal with theme B. This separation is even greater after
the third listening session, suggesting that this more sophisticated dimension
becomes increasingly important as subjects become more knowledgeable about
the composition.
Strong support for this interpretation is provided by the results obtained in an
expert condition. Pollard-Gott (1983) obtained the same ratings from a group of
subjects who had received extensive musical training. For these subjects, she
obtained a SINDSCAL solution that accounted for 84% of the variance in one
dimension. This thematic dimension again clustered those passages that dealt
with iheme A at one end of the dimension and those that dealt with theme B at
the other end of the dimension.
At even a higher level, Halpern (1984) has investigated memory organization
for familiar songs. She posited that relations between songs could involve extramusical similarity or musical similarity. To assess the organization, she gave
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subjects 60 songs and asked them to sort them into groups of songs that were
similar either in terms of their musical similarity (such as tempo, rhythm, and the
like) or in terms of their nonmusical similarity (described simply as on some
basis other than how they sound) .
Halpern analyzed her results using both KYST and ADDTREE. Her scaling
solutions were difficult to interpret and yielded poor fits (though using a maximum dimensionality of three and stress formula two may have contributed to the
poor fits she obtained). In any event, the ADDTREE solutions for nonmusical
similarity were readily interpretable and accounted for a high proportion (.92) of
variance. A number of distinctive clusters emerged . For example, all of the
Christmas songs clustered together in the nonmusical solution and these songs
were further distinguished into groups of solemn Christmas songs (such as The
First Noel) and children's Christmas songs (such as Rudolf the Red-Nosed Reindeer). The musical sol ution produced neither as satisfactory a fit (.71 of the
variance) nor as interpretable a solution . However, some interesting results occurred. The two groups of Christmas songs were no longer classified together;
solemn Christmas songs were grouped with patriotic ones (such as God Bless
America) while children's Christmas songs were classified with other chi ldren's
songs (such as Happy Birthday). However, many songs retained similar positions in the tree structure across the two instructions. Although one might argue
that this result is an artifact of the experimental procedure in which each subject
performed both sets of ratings, it seems more likely to us that songs that are
related by topic may simply be inherently more similar musically than pairs of
songs not so related. For example, Beatie songs are sim ilar to each other on the
basis that they were all recorded by the same artists, yet they are also similar
musically .
Halpern (1984) went on to demonstrate that the distance in the tree structure
was able to predict performance quite well in two cogn itive tasks . In one task,
she presented subjects with a song title and the music of a song and asked them to
verify that the presented title was correct for the song. When title and song
mismatched, she found that the discrimination was more error prone when the
two songs were near each other in the tree diagram. In a free recall task, she
found that adjacent songs were more likely to be recalled together than songs that
were far apart. Halpern's results are consistent with the idea that familiar songs
are organized in memory by conceptual (nonmusical) characteristics.
In many respects, music perception is ideally suited to MDS analysis. The
research is currently at a stage where it is important to learn how the psychological representation differs from a representation that merely mirrors physical
characteristics. In contrast to the research on semantic memory , for example, we
really do not have any theories of music perception . Instead, we are searching for
constraints on such a theory and MDS analysis has provided us with a number of
them. They range from the perception of tones in various contexts to the perception of passages in a piece of classical music to the organization of familiar
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songs. We have now perhaps reached the point where cognitive psychologists are
ready to develop a theory of how people make these judgments of similarity.

MEASUREMENT OF CHANGE IN STRUCTURE
Some of the most impressive applications of MDS analyses have been in demonstrating a change in structure. This change can be the result of a change in
conditions, context , or age. By the examination of a set of stimuli in various
circumstances, it may also be possible to extract higher dimensionality from the
materials in question . At a minimum , it provides good evidence fo r change.
Perhaps the most obvious place to look for an application of MDS that
demonstrates a change in structure is in the area of cognitive development.
Several investigators in this area have attempted to show that younger children
organi ze stimuli along perceptual dimensions while older children employ more
abstract dimensions. One study that illustrates this point very nicely was performed by Howard and Howard (1977). They selected 10 animal names from
Henley' s (l969) original set and had their simil arity judged by children of varying ages. The subjects were first-graders, third-graders, sixth-graders, and college students. Using Carroll and Chang's (1 970) INDSCAL , they obtained a
three-dimensional solution in which the three dimensions were size, domesticity ,
and predativity . Although these last two are usually thought of as equivalent ,
Howard and Howard make a good case that these dimensions are distinguishable.
For the predativity dimension , lion and bear are at one extre me and mouse,
rabbit, and deer are at the other. For the domesticity dimension , all fi ve objects
are on one side of the dimension , with horse, cow , sheep, pig, and dog at the
other.
Howard and Howard (1 977) looked for a change in structure by examining the
weight assigned to each dimension in the subject space. When they averaged
over subj ects in each age group , they found that younger children emphasized the
perceptual dimension : size. Older children in contrast, emphas ized the more
abstract dimensions of domesticity and predativity. Sixth-graders, for example,
pl aced equal weight on the size and predativity dimensions and less weight on the
domesticity dimension . Younger children pl aced greater weight on the size dimensions, whil e college students placed less weight on the size dimension . Thus,
it does seem that increasing age leads to increas ing reliance on more abstract
dimensions, at least with these stimuli.
Mi ller and Gelman (1 983 ) have recently demonstrated a similar point with a
more complicated analysis. They investi gated the concept of number in children
using techniques developed by Arabie, Kosslyn, an9 Nelson ( 1975). Miller and
Gelman ( 1983) obtained similarity judgments for the digits 0 to 9 from groups of
kindergartners, third-graders, sixth-graders, and graduate students. They used a
modification of the method of tri ads in which subjects determined which of two
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digits was more similar to a third . In order to reduce drastically the number of
judgments required of very young children, Miller and Gelman used a balanced
incomplete sampling procedure developed by Arabie et al. (1975).
Miller and Gelman (1983) obtained two-dimensional solutions for each of the
four groups. For the younger children , the solution resembled a semicircle in
which the digits were ordered by magnitude . For sixth-graders and adults, there
is clearly an odd-even dimension in addition to one based on magnitude. For
adults, moreover, a paradoxical finding is that the powers of two (2, 4, and 8) are
closer together than they should be in terms of magnitude; the digits 2 and 8 are
actually closer than the digits 2 and 7 , for example.
Although the results of the MDS analysis were certainly enlightening, Miller
and Gelman's most interesting results were observed in their clustering analysis.
Using INDCLUS, they obtained seven clusters. Five of them pertained to counting, and the other two were the odd numbers excluding I (3, 5, 7, 9) and the
powers of two (2, 4, 8). For the children in the two youngest groups, the five
counting clusters were all assigned higher weights than these last two clusters.
For the adults, however , the powers of two was the cluster with the highest
weight, and the odd numbers excluding one was the fourth highest. Sixth-graders
were between these two extremes.
The results of the INDCLUS analysis nicely complement the results from the
MDS analyses in that both show increasing complexity as a function of age.
There is a clear developmental trend away from counting as the sole dimension in
digits and toward dimensions that reflect more complex relationships among the
digits (such as the powers of two) . Methodologically, it is interesting to note that
the clustering analysis performed by Miller and Gelman (198 3) parallels the
scaling analysis done by Howard and Howard (1977). Both sets of authors used a
single result , a set of seven clusters for Miller and Gelman, and a three-dimensional solution for Howard and Howard, and then examined the change in
weights as a function of age . Both observed that more complex dimensions or
clusters tended to be weighted more heav ily by older children and adults accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the weighting for more primitive dimensions or clusters. We might also note that the Miller and Gelman (1 983) paper is
particularly convincing in this respect because these authors also obtained MDS
representations for each group of subjects and the analyses of these solutions
were highly consistent with this interpretation .
One other unusual application to assess a change in structure has been performed by Schoenfeld and Herrmann (1982) . They investigated the perception of
the similarity of difficult word problems in mathematics. Earlier studies (e.g.,
Chi , Feltovich, & Glaser, L981) had shown a strong, but indirect, relationship
between expertise and problem perception , with novices tending to use surface
features and experts using deep , structural feat ures. This study examined
whether a course in problem soLving would lead to changes in problem perception. Each problem was characterized by both a deep structure representation
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(refening to the principles necessary for solution , such as uniqueness arguments
to be proved by contradiction, DeMorgan's Law, or linear dophantine equation)
and a surface structure (referring to the salient mathematical objects involved or
the subject area, such as polynomials, subset sums, or limits). Schoenfeld and
Herrmann asked groups of subj ects to sort the problems and then looked at the
strongly clustered problems to see whether these problems were more alike in
surface structure or in deep structure. Using Johnson's (1967) HICLUS program,
they defined strongly clustered pairs as those whose proximity value exceeded .5. The subjects were freshman and sophomores who had completed 1 to 3
semesters of college mathematics. One group subsequentl y enro lled in a problem
solving course and the other group instead enrolled in a computer programming
course. The sortings of the two groups did not differ initially. Subsequent to
these courses, the same problems were sorted again .
The results were quite striking . Prior to course enrollment , most of the strongly associated clusters (67%) were accounted for by surface similarity. Approximately II % of the clusters matched the deep structure characterization and
approximately 22% matched neither. For the group that took the computer programm ing course, the percentage changed very little; 64% of the clusters were
still simi lar on the basis of the surface structure (with a deep structure percentage
of 9) . For the group that took the problem solving course, however, the results
changed markedly. Now , 55% of the cl usters matched the deep structure characterization, while only 9% matched the surface structure characterization . As a
further control , Schoenfe ld and Herrmann had these problems sorted by a group
of mathematics professors. For these experts, 67% of their strong ly c lustered
pairs were similar in terms of deep structure and 25% were simil ar in terms of
surface structure.
T hus, it seems that taking a course and increasing one's knowledge about a
particular domain can have fairly radical effects on one's perception of problems
in that domain. It would have been interesting if Schoenfeld and Herrmann had
applied MDS techniques to their data and used an analysis similar to the one
performed by Miller and Gelman. Even so, they have succeeded in showing a
large change in structure in a complex domain .

CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS
One of the most important uses of MDS analys is in cogn itive psychology is also
one of the most underutilized. MDS analysis provides an excellent means to
assess the effects of context. Examining stimuli in a number of contexts may
have the coroll ary benefit of extracting more dimensions .
O ne straightforward application of this strategy was performed by LaPorte
and Voss ( 1979) in which they presented subjects with a set of nouns taken from
one or two simple stories. Initially, subjects rated the simil arity of all possible
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pairs of nouns. For one story, the nouns were: fields. clouds. vegetation. train.
approach. decade. troops. plague. eggs. and food . MDS analysis of this initial
simi larity matrix yielded a two-dimensional solution in which the first dimension
separated man-made objects from natural ones , and the second dimension was
interpreted by the authors as separating animals from nonanimals with eggs and
food at one extreme and clouds and fields at the other.
Subsequent to this initial rating task , subjects read a story that described how
grasshoppers become a pest every 10 years . These subjects then performed the
same rating task as before. The first dimension recovered by the MDS analysis
was the same as before and reflected the distinction between natural and manmade objects. The second dimension , however , was radically different and reflected the temporal ordering of the objects as they occurred in the story.
Bisanz, LaPorte, Vesonder, and Voss (1978) developed a more extensive
framework for studying the effects of prose context. Like LaPorte and Voss
(1979) , Bisanz et al. were able to demonstrate an effect of context by comparing
representations. However, they were also able to recover the thematic structure
of the prose context. Finally , and perhaps most importantly , Bisanz et al. were
able to show that the recovered representation cou ld also predict memory
performance.
Bisanz et al. (1978) presented subjects with pairs of animal names either
before or after reading a short story that contained each of these names. When
subjects judged the simi larity of these animals before reading the story, the
resulting MDS solution was very similar to the one obtained by Rips et al.
(1973) ; the two dimensions cou ld be characterized in terms of size and ferocity.
Subjects then read a story in which all of the animals were portrayed in terms of
their leadership and their helpfulness. Subsequently , they were asked to judge
the similarity of the animals in terms of their relationship as expressed in the
story. Both themes were recovered as dimensions in the MDS analysis, although ,
interestingly , these themes were not recovered equally well.
Bisanz et al. (1978) also used this poststory MDS solution to predict performance in a memory task . They presented subjects with pairs of anima l names and
asked subjects to decide if they were both helpful or both not helpful. At least for
affirmative responses , it was clear that the distance between the two animals in
the multidimensional space predicted the latencies fairly well . Pairs that were
close to each other were responded to more rapidly than pairs that were far apart.
Although Bisanz et al. found a relationship between distance and latency, it
might have been possible to obtain greater predictability in their task . The only
distance that they examined was the distance between the two stimuli in the pair.
It is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that the distance between each of the
items and the point for helpful might influence decision time for affirmative
responses. Further, these di stances might be even more important for negative
responses. Let us assume that lion is helpful and tiger is not. If one also assumes
that lion is processed first , then a straightforward processing model suggests that
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the lion-helpful distance is related to the speed with which one can determine that
a lion is a helpful animal. The question then becomes whether or not tigers are
helpful. Here, the distance between tiger and helpful is the critical determinant.
Because the correct answer is negative, we expect that short distances will make
it more difficult to conclude that tigers are not helpful. Thus , small distances are
inhibitory and large distances facilitative for negative decisions.
Obviously, this analysis is purely speculative. However, it does explain why
Bisanz et al. (1978) obtained better predictability with affirmative responses .
Additionally, usi ng a categorization task, Shoben (1976) found that the distance
between the exemplars and the appropriate superordinate was always a better
predictor than the distance between the two exemplars in a same-d ifferent task. It
is our contention that similar research could profit from this kind of MDS
analysis as it leads to a fairly direct comparison of several alternative processing
accounts.

CONTEXT AND INCREASED DIMENSIONALITY
Using several contexts can increase the dimensionality of the solution recovered
by MOS. Although increased dimensionality is quite properly not the principal
goal in investigating the effects of context, the ability to recover additi onal
dimensions is a byproduct that should not be ignored. Although there is not a
hard and fas t rule that increas ing the number of contexts will increase the number
of recoverable dimensions, it is at least suggestive that Howard and Howard
(1977) were able to extract three dimensions from their INDSCAL solution
(using four contexts) of 10 animal names whereas Rips et al. ( 1973) could extract
only two dimensions from their INDSCAL solution even though they employed
14 animal names.
The most striking example of the higher dimensionality arising from increasing the number of contexts is a study by Soli and Arabie (1979) of consonant
phonemes. They used the classic Miller and Nicely ( 1955) data which Soli and
Arabie (1979) transformed to conform better to the INDSCAL model (see Arabie
& Soli, 1982, for the justification and details of thi s procedure). In contrast to
earlier analyses of the Miller-Nicely data using scaling techniques, Soli and
Arabie (1979) used the full set of confusion matrices, including those where the
judgments were made under severe levels of distortion .
Soli and Arabie (1979) obtained a four-dimensional solution that accounted
for 69% of the variance. The ir first dimension ordered the consonants in terms of
periodicity/ burst with m l and nl at one end of the dimension and pi, tI, k/, fI,
and sl at the other. The second dimension ordered the stimuli in terms of first
formants and thus separated the vo iced consonants from the voiceless ones. The
third dimension simil arl y ordered the consonants in terms of their second formants. Finally , the fourth dimension ordered the stimuli in terms of spectral
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dispersion, with two groups of fricatives separated from the other phonemes.
This fourth dimension is largely relevant to a particular listening condition.
Soli and Arabie (1979) showed that the salience of a particular dimension
varied greatly with the listening condition. In general, increasing levels of degradation increased the reliance on the periodicity/burst and first formant dimensions and decreased the contribution of the second formant and spectral dispersion dimensions . Thus, Soli and Arabie were able to extract additional information out of an old and very well-analyzed data set. By making the data conform
more closely to the INDSCAL model, they were able to extract more justifiable
dimensions from these data than any prior researchers had been able to do. More
importantly, this higher dimensionality enabled them to make some arg uments
concerning the relative importance of acoustic as opposed to phonemic properties
in the underlying representation. From these examples, it appears that MDS can
be a very powerful tool in assessing contextual change. In many respects, it is
unfortunate that researchers in cognitive psychology have not taken greater advantage of this opportunity. Particularly given the trend in the past decade away
from the view that concepts have invariant meanings and toward the view that
meanings are flexible, it would seem that these procedures cou ld be put to good
use. For example, one of us has been involved in research on context effects in
semantic memory. Roth and Shoben (1983) argued that context determined the
goodness-of-example of an exemplar for any category. They found that robin
was a typical exemplar of the bird category in many contexts, but that it was a
poor example in contexts such as "The bird walked across the farmyard" or
"The hunter fired too quickly and the bird flew off." Roth and Shoben (1983)
even discussed this change in goodness-of-example in terms of a spatial metaphor in which the stimu lus space must be completely restructured and not simply
refocused. The addition of the different spatial representations would certainly
have added weight to Roth and Shoben's argument. If, for example, the solutions
obtained for the bird exemplars from MDS analyses were quite different depending on whether the ratings were performed in the context of "The bird sat on a
telephone wire" or "John removed the bird from the oven ," then one would
have very good evidence for the restructuring hypothesis.
Similarly, Cech and Shoben (1985) have argued that linear order judgments in
which subjects must determine which of two objects is greater (or lesser) in
magnitude are also subject to rather strong contextual effects. They investigated
the way in which subjects determined which of two animals was larger or
smaller. In a normal context in which the animals varied in size from flea to
elephant, they observed the normal congruity effect (Banks, 1977). For small
animals, it was easier to determine the smaller of the pair; for large animals, it
was easier to determine the larger of the pair. Cech and Shoben (1985) found that
it took less time for subjects to determine the smaller of rabbit-beaver than to
determine the larger of rabbit-beaver. They also found that it was easier to
determine the larger of sheep-crocodile than the smaller of sheep-crocodile.
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However, when rabbit and beaver were the largest items in the study, Cech and
Shoben observed that they behaved like large animals; in this context, it was
easier to determine the larger of rabbit-beaver than the smaller of rabbit-beaver.
A parallel result was obtained for large items.
Although Cech and Shoben employed a number of other contexts to strengthen their contention that memorial size was not invariant, it seems that MOS
analysis might also have profitably been applied here as well. According to the
claims of Cech and Shoben (1985), animals that are small shou ld behave as large
animals in certain contexts. If this claim is correct, then one should be ab le to
compare the MOS solutions from the two different contexts and see a size
dimension in both cases. However, if we are comparing only small animals in the
restricted context condition , we should find at least some of these small animals
on the large side of the neutral point of the dimension. The size dimension for the
normal context condition should divide the animals into those that are generally
thought of as large and small. Such a result would strengthen Cech and Shoben's
more theoretical claim that people recode sizes in order to be able to use the full
range of the magnitude scale.
It thus appears that MOS can be very helpful in understanding the effects of
context. It can tell us how dimensional weights change as a function of context or
age (Bisanz et aI., 1978; Miller & Gelman, 1983) and it can also provide us with
increased dimensionality in some cases (Howard & Howard, 1977; Soli & Arabie, 1979) . We have also argued in the immediately preceding paragraphs that
MOS analysis can be used to provide confirmation of many theoretical claims in
cognitive psychology.

MDS AND THE UNDERLYING REPRESENTATION
In our discussion of applications of MOS, we have obviously used the term quite
broadly. We have included not only two-way and three-way MOS, but also
discrete, clustering algorithms such as MAPCLUS. It is a natural question to ask
which of these models provides a best fit to data from cognitive experiments.
Although the question may arise naturally, the answer does not. Even if the
statistics concerning the goodness-of-fit are nominally identical, it is seldom the
case that one can simply compare the numbers and determine which model fits
better because the number of parameters is invariably different. In many respects, the adv ice to be given is simi lar in spirit to Shepard's counsel on dimensionality: use the one that fits the data the best.
One approach to this problem is theoretically based . If one has a theory that is
inherently spatial, then it makes sense to test the viability of the theory by
ascertaining whether MOS analysis will provide a satisfactory account. Friendly
(1977) has followed this procedure for recall data. A similar approach has been
performed by Reitman and Reuter (1980) . Although their technique is only
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peripherally related to MDS, they used their theoretical notions to identify
chunks in free recall, which they then converted into a lattice and finally into an
ordered tree. Hirtle (1982) has recently extended this line of work.
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to compare theories directly is the work
by Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982). They compared the fit of a simple
additive tree, as exemplified by Sattath and Tversky's (1979) ADDTREE to
MDS as exemplified by KYST. They first demonstrated that each of these
algorithms provided a better fit to artificial data when the underlying representation was consistent with the assumptions of the program . Specifically, when the
artificial data was generated from a tree, ADDTREE provided a better fit; when
the artificial data were generated from a plane, KYST gave a better fit to the
data . This relationship held up over many levels of noise in the data and over
wide variations in number of stimuli. Thus it seems that there is no uniform
advantage of one procedure over the other.
Pruzansky et al. (1982) found two empirical measures that predicted which of
the two models would provide a better fit to data (as measured either by product
moment correlations or by stress formula 2). The first was skewness, defined in
the standard way as the third central moment divided by the cubed standard
deviation . The second measure was elongation. Pruzansky et al. defined elongation in terms of triples of nodes. From the nature of binary rooted trees, they
observed that it is usually the case that for any triple of nodes , two will form a
subcluster. For a triple that includes i, j, and k, ass ume that i and j form the
subcluster. If we look at the triangle formed by connecting these three points,
then it is expected that <Pij ::5 <Pjk ::5 <P ik . It would simil arly be expected that the
differences of the distances would have the relationship <Pik - <Pjk ::5 <Pjk - <Pi)'
Phrased geometrically, the middle side is closer in length to the long side than it
is to the short side. Pruzansky et al. defined elongation as the proportion of
triangles in the data where this re lationship holds .
Looking at real data , Pruzansky et al. (1982) computed these two measures
for 20 data sets. In general, when the elongation measure was high and skewness
was low , ADDTREE provided a better fit than did KYST. More explicitly when
the elongation measure was .65 or higher and when the skewness was less than
-.4, ADDTREE provided a better fit; otherwise KYST did. Interestingly , these
two measures never conflicted for the data sets that Pruzansky et al. examined
and the two measures tended to be negatively correlated.
An important result of this analysis is that data sets whose stimuli could be
described as perceptual (colors, forms , and letters) were better fit by KYST, but
data sets whose stimuli could be described as conceptual (such as exemplars from
semantic categories) were better fit by ADDTREE. Although Pruzansky et al.
noted that factorial designs tended to favor KYST and that such designs tended to
be employed when perceptual stimu li were investigated, these authors offered no
other explanation of this result.
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Although there is no doubt that Pruzansky et al.'s ( 1982) finding is suggestive, we believe that there is reason for caution before concluding that conceptual stimu li are invariably fit better by ADDTREE than by KYST. As we
discuss in the next section, there are good reasons to suspect that MDS algorithms have difficulty when category names and exemplars must be represented in the same space. Thus, one difficulty may lie in the particular stimulus
sets employed by Pruzansky et al. (1982). Although most of them are unpublished, we have sufficient familiarity with eight of them to offer some speculation. The first seven data sets (referenced by Pruzansky et al as the Mervis et
al data sets) consisted of 19 exemplars and one category name. The eighth data
set (Henley, 1969) consisted of 30 exemplars and no category name. For the first
seven data sets, the superiority of ADDTREE as determined by both of Pruzansky et al.'s (1982) measures of goodness of fit averaged .15 for r2L and .07
for r 2 M . The superiority of ADDTREE for the eighth data set was about half
these means, .08 and .03 respectively. Only one of the first seven data sets had
smaller differences (in the goodness-of-fit measures) than did Henley's data set.

PROBLEMS WITH CATEGORIES
The difficulty that MDS has with categorical data sets may be a res ult of the way
people judge simi larities in this context and not an indication of the nature of the
underlying representation. We would like to suggest (following Shoben, 1983)
that the peculiarities of the similarity judgments may create problems for scaling
algorithms and that these problems may have led Pruzansky et al. (1982) to find
poorer fits with KYST than with ADDTREE for these types of data sets.
As others have found, Shoben (1976) noted that all members of a category
tended to be rated as highly simi lar to their category name. For example, even an
atypical bird such as goose was judged to be quite simi lar to bird. In fact , the
simi larity of these two terms was about as great as the simi larity between two
very similar exemplars , such as hawk and eagle. The problem for scaling algorithms arises when one considers that both robin and goose are highly simi lar
to bird, but robin and goose are quite dissimilar to each other. In an MDS
solution, robin and goose should be quite distant from each other because of their
direct simi larity rating. However, because of the proximity of each to bird, they
shou ld be quite close to each other. Put more generally , the distances between
exemplars often conflict with the distances between each exemplar and the
superordinate. This type of conflict is not present if superordinate terms are not
among the test stimuli. Therefore, it is possible that the reason that Henley's
(1969) data were fit relatively well by KYST in the study by Pruzansky et al. is
that her data did not contain superordinate terms.
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Some very recent work by Tversky and Hutchinson (1986) has formalized this
generalization. They noted that the situation in which many exemplars are most
similar to the superordinate is an example of the Voronoi problem (e.g ., Newman, Rinott, & Tversky, 1983) in which only a small number of points in a space
can be the nearest neighbor of a particular point. In terms of the spatial representation (using Euclidean distance) of categories, the superordinate can have only
five exemplars (in a two-dimensional solution; 11 in a three-dimensional solution) for which it is the nearest neighbor. As their Table 3 indicates, this constraint is violated in many cases in which exemplars are scaled with their
superordinates.
One obvious solution to this problem is to omit the superordinate. If one is
interested primarily in the relationships among exemplars, then this solution can
provide a distinct improvement. As measured by Tversky and Hutchinson, removing the superordinate greatly reduced the nearest neighbor problems in the
data (as measured by their statistics of centrality and reciprocity) and subsequent
scaling usually showed a decrease in stress when the superordinate term was
removed.
It is not clear how one can circumvent the problem of superordinate terms
when the relationship between the exemplar and category name is important. In
some sense the difficulty for algorithms such as KYST's is to fit the distance
between exemplars and the distance between exemplars and the superordinate
category name (typicality) at the same time. One possibility is to try to fit these
two types of distances separately; another approach is simply to decide that one
set of distances is less important than another. We discuss each of these issues in
turn.
Krumhansl (1983) attempted to measure the typicality of exemplars (in this
case, musical tones) separately. She argued that the similarity of two terms is a
function not only of the distance between two objects, but also of the distance
between each object and the superordinate. In the absence of explicit context, the
stimuli are structured in a chroma circle, as we noted earlier. However, when she
varied the context (in terms of which scale was used) she showed that not only
did the notes vary in their proximity to the superordinate (vertical structure); they
also varied in terms of their relationship to each other (horizontal structure).
Although this structure is certainly an elegant one, it is not clear how general
it might be. For musical tones, it appears that context refocuses the horizontal
structure; it does not require a radical restructuring. For semantic categories , if
we are to take the conclusions of Roth and Shoben (1983) at face value, radical
restructuring is at least a possibility , and thus this method developed by Krumhans I (1983) might not be applicable in such circumstances.
An alternative approach is simply to decide that one set of distances is less
important than another. For example, Shoben (1976) used MDS analysis to
derive distances which he then used to predict RT in a categorization task. To
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perform the necessary regressions, the distances he needed were the exemplarsuperordinate distances . In the initial MDS solution , an examination of the
Shepard diagram indicated that the greatest disparity between the fitted distances
and the original data occurred with superordinates. Because these distances were
precisely the ones that Shoben wanted to use in subsequent analyses, he rescaled
the original using the weights option in KYST. This little-known feature of
KYST allows the user to specify weights for various similarities. In thi s particular case, Shoben (1976) weighted the exemplar-superordinate similarities very
heavily in order to ensure that the disparity between the original data and the
fitted di stances would be minimal for these pairs. For his task, the manipulation
was highly successful in that these exemplar-superordinate distances predicted
RT very well.

SELECTING A REPRESENTATION

There are no hard and fast rules for selecting a single underlying representation.
Shepard (1980) , among others, has argued that the interpretab ility of the solution
is one important criterion. Clearly, the plausibility of the underlying representation is not enhanced if the so lution is not interpretable. However, this criterion is
far from objective. We have discussed several solutions based on Henley's
(1969) animal data that are readily interpretable. Yet, Sattath and Tversky ( (979)
have argued that their ADDTREE solution of these data is more interpretable
than the ones obtained by MOS.
Moreover, there are often theoretical reasons for preferring one solution to
another. Krumhansl (1983), as noted earlier, had excellent theoretical reasons for
analyzing her data on musical tones in a particular way . Because she wanted to
examine the similarity of the tones to each other and the typicality of each tone
with respect to a particular scale separately, her choice of the underlying representation was severely limited. Moreover, there may also be other data that
constrain what is the ideal representation.
Thus, the criteria established by Pruzansky et aJ. (J 982) should not be taken
too literally . Although their generalization that conceptual data are fit better by
an additive tree whereas perceptual data are better represented by a plane is a
provocative concl usion , one should not rule out an entire class of models because
of this conclusion . Besides the additional criteria of interpretability and other
constraints on the representation, there may be peculiarities of particular data sets
(such as categories) that may have led to artificially poor fits.
Finally , it should be pointed out that subtle changes in method may make a
tremendous difference in the results. The best example of this phenomenon is the
reanalysis of the Miller-Nicely data by Soli and Arabie (J 979). According to the
Pruzansky et aJ. (1982) classification, both INDSCAL and MDSCAL assume
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that the underlying representation is a plane, yet Soli and Arabie used the former
method and were able to recover four , highly interpretable, dimensions while
Shepard used the latter and recovered only two . It thus seems premature to
specify any clear set of rules for determining the best underlying representation
for any set of data.

MINKOWSKI

r METRICS

Most applications of MDS and related procedures in cognitive psychology have
assumed that the psychological distances recovered are Euclidean. However,
there is good reason to suspect that there are many circumstances where some
other, theoretically interesting , metric might provide a better fit to the data .
Moreover, the selection of the Euclidean metric also has psychological implications for our conception of the stimu li . More specifically , it has been argued by
Shepard (1964) and by Garner (1972) that if the stimuli are best represented in a
Euclidean space, then the stimuli are wholi stic or integral, rather than analyzable
or separable. Unfortunately, many have ass umed that their stimuli were integral
without a thorough exploration of other possibilities.
In the most general sense, the equation for distance is given in Equation 2. We
can restrict our attention to the Minkowski family of metrics when r 2: I.
d ij --

[~
~k IX

ik -

xjk 11'] 1/1'

(2)

In the case where r is 2, then we have the fami liar Euclidean case; the distance
between two points is the square root of the sum of the squared differences along
all the relevant dimensions.
However, in addition to the Euclidean metric, there are at least two other
metrics that are theoretically interesting. The first of these is the city-block
metric, so named because distance is computed in the manner in which one
measures distance in a city that is laid out in a grid pattern . For examp le, to go
from 42nd Street and 10th A venue to 32nd street and 6th Aven ue in New York is
a distance of 14 blocks. One cannot travel along the hypotenuse of the triangle.
In terms of dimensions, the distance between the two locations is the sum of their
differences on the two dimensions: north-south distance and east-west distance.
In terms of Eq uation 2, city-block metric is obtained when r = I. This metric is
particularly interesting to psychologists because it (according to Garner [1 972]
and Shepard [1964]) indicates that the stimuli are separable rather than integral.
The other theoretically interesting metric is the dominance metric, when r
approaches infinity. In this case, the distance between two objects reduces to the
maximum distance between them on any dimension. Thus , for example, two
objects that differ from each other by a moderate amount on each of three
dimensions are closer to each other -than another pair of objects that differ only
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slightly on two dimensions, but differ greatly on a third dimension . Although
there have been few applications of this metric in psychology, Arnold (1971)
found this metric fit his set of heterogeneous semantic terms better than did either
the city-block or Euclidean metrics . Moreover, he arg ued that the dominance
metric was psychologically more plausible than the Euclidean metric.
Although these two non-Euclidean metrics are inherently interesting, there are
understandable reasons why they have not received greater attention in applications of MDS in cognitive psychology. The first reason is that numerical problems are much more likely to be encountered with city-block or dominance
metrics. When working with Euclidean distances, one can begin with a rational
configuration or use some small number of random initial configurations and be
reasonably confident that the solution is a minimum. Such a procedure will
seldom produce optimal results for non-Euclidean metrics . It appears that local
minimum problems are much more severe, and that vastly greater numbers of
random initial configurations must be used (Arabie, 1973) when r is other than 2.
Fortunately, Arnold (1971) has devised a method to circumvent most of these
problems. As it can be both time consuming and expensive to run large numbers
of random initial configurations, Arnold proposed a success ive approximation
procedure that is neither time cons uming nor expensive. One begins by obtaining
the best solution when r = 2. Approaching city-block metric, one then uses the
final configuration for r = 2 as the starting configuration for r = 1.5. Subsequently , the solution with this metric is used as the starting configuration for r =
1.25, and so on. One approaches the dominance metric (with r usually set to 32)
is a similar way; one uses the best solution in Euclidean space as the starti ng
configuration for r = 2.5, and so on.
When Arnold (1971) employed this procedure on his data, he obtained some
striking findings. First, he found that stress declined monotonically as r moved
from 2 to 1; it also decl ined monotonically as r moved from 2 to 32. Second , the
solution with the lowest stress was the one employing the dominance metric . To
our know ledge, this report is the only application of MDS methods to cognitive
psychology that has fo und evidence for the psychological use of the dominance
metric.
As we noted earlier, the question of the appropriate metric is an exceedingly
important one from the perspective of cognitive psychology. How the dimensions are processed is nearly as important as what the dimens ions are. Models ,
for example, that ass ume that pairs of words in a same-different task are compared on all dimensions do not seem telTibly plausible if the underlying metric is
the dominance metric . Arnold's procedure is seldom cited, but it holds the
potential to surmount a formidable obstac le. Cognitive psychologists would do
well to become fa mili ar with these methods . There is one important limitation to
Arnold's procedure. For some unknown reason , it does not appear to work very
well with two-dimensional solutions (Carroll & Arabie, 1980).
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MDS AND MEMORY THEORIES

In this chapter, we have discussed a number of different scaling techniques and
provided some suggestions for their optimal use to study issues in cognitive
psychology. In this section, we illustrate these techniques and suggestions by
examining a particular problem. We considered using some well-known data set
or gathering some new data on a very specific issue, but we felt that such a
specialized topic might be of interest to only a limited group of readers. For
broader appeal, we elected to collect and analyze data on a topic that is not
usually studied by cognitive psychologists: What is the conceptual organization
that cognitive psychologists have of prominent memory theories? Although we
hope to learn something about the organization of the field, our main purpose is
to allow an illustration of techniques in an interesting context.
Some earlier research has been aimed at analyzing the organization that psychologists have of their field. Coan (1968), by a combination of factor analysis
and clustering techniques, examined how basic trends in psychology (e.g., objectivism) have changed historically and how they have been related over time.
Fuchs and Kawash (1974; Kawash & Fuchs, 1974) used ratings and then factor
analysis to describe six basic schools of psychology (e .g. , behaviorism) and
summarize their differences. As part of a project examining the learning of the
structure of cognitive psychology, Friendly (1981) scaled student and faculty
views of the field.
In the present case, two small groups of cognitive psychologists were asked to
rate the pairwise similarities of 12 memory theories . (The two groups enabled us
to analyze individual differences between groups as well as within groups, to
illustrate another use of these scaling techniques.) These 12 theories were chosen
from a larger list with the requirements that they be familiar to the subjects, that
they not be intimately related to each other, and that they be partially concerned
with memory for episodic information. The theories are listed in Table 7 . 1, with
short descriptions and bracketed abbreviations to be used for brevity. Each
subject received a random order of all 66 possible pairs of theories and rated
them on a scale of I (very different) to 9 (very similar). One group consisted of
four advanced graduate students at Stanford University and one visiting professor. These ratings were obtained in 1981. The other group consisted of five
faculty or visiting faculty at the University of Illinois in 1985. Four of these
faculty members have their doctoral degrees from midwestern universities.
There are two basic questions of interest. First, what is the underlying representation of memory theories for these researchers? Second , do the two groups
differ?
Before presenting the results , let us go over the form of the data to be
analyzed. For each of these ten subjects, we have a lower half matrix (without
diagonals) for the pairwise similarities of these 12 theories . In addition , for each
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group, we have the sum of the five individual matrices for that group , as well as
the total matrix of all ten subjects. We analyzed our data first using MDS
techniques and then using the more recent clustering techniques.

MDS Analysis. The most satisfactory answers to the two basic questions we
raised earlier are obtained by performing a SINDSCAL analysis, where the two
groups are used instead of individual subjects. The two dimensional solution from
this scaling is given in Fig. 7 . 1, accounting for. 728 of the variance. Although
SINDSCAL does have the advantage of allowing the recovery of higher dimensionality , our third dimension was difficult to interpret. Moreover, the increase in
variance accounted for was small: the proportion increased .032 to .760. Our
interpretation of Fig. 7.1 is that the X-ax is corresponds to the unit of material being
analyzed, while the Y-axis corresponds to the degree of formalism or rigor. First,
let us consider the abscissa. The two theories furthest to the left are the SCHEMA
and MOPS models, followed closely by LNR, KINTSCH, then HAM. The first
two theories deal with large units of analysis; groups of scenes, stories, or
episodes. LNR and KINTSCH usually apply to slightly smaller units, such as
small groups of sentences. HAM also is concerned with small groups of sentences,
but much of the well-known work has involved one or a few sentences. The other
seven theories usually deal with smaller units, such as sentence fragments or
paired-associates. TULVNG and LEVELS often deal with slightly larger units
than the other five, but the exact ordering expected by this interpretation for the
other theories is unclear.
Second, let us consider the ordinate. The two theories highest on this dimension , RATCLIFF and VECTOR have strong mathematical form ul ations, as does
the distant third theory, SAM. The next two theories, HAM and LNR, have
strong computer formulations. The four theories around the origin, although not
as strongly formalized, have strong and well -defined structure and processing
ass umptions. The three theories lowest on thi s dimension are espoused by psychologists who have concentrated on developing general principles, rather than
on developing formal models. Of these three, TUL VING has certainly been the
most rigorous.
Given this interpretation, we may next ask whether our two groups of subjects
differed in their weightings of the dimensions. In fact the two groups weighted
both dimensions very simi larly (.60 and .63, for the X-axis, and .58 and .55 for
the Y-axis). Hence, from this analysis, there appears to be little difference
between the two groups . Because the two groups were so similar, SINDSCAL
was applied to the ten individual matrices. The object space is similar enough to
Fig. 7. I that it would serve no purpose to present it , but the subj ect space is
presented in Fig . 7.2 for pedagogical purposes . As one can see , two of the
subjects appear to weight particular dimensions, but overall the dimensions
appear to be used by all subjects. Moreover, it is clear that subj ects' group
membership is not related to their assignment of weights to dimensions.

TABLE 7. I
Brief Description of Scaled Theories
(Bracketed Names are Used in Figures and Text)

N
C1

m

1. James Anderson's (1973; Anderson et al., 1977)

As§oci~tive

Theories

[VECTOR]

Anderson's theory is a distributed memQry model with vectors representing patterns of individual
neurons. Associations between items are modeled by a reweighting of the synaptic weights between all
cells. The model has been ap?lied to various paradigms including item recognition and categorization.
2. HAM - John Anderson & Bower (1973)

[HAM]

In HAM, information is encoded as propos itions in an associative network. Querie s are answered by
an activation search of the network. Most of the experimental work used sentence's or small group of
sentences as stimuli. Computer simulations and mathematical modeling were used to derive the predictions.
3. Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968)

[A&S]

This theory distinguishes between structure features of memo ry and control processes. The structural features include the sensory register, STM, and LTM and decay rules. The control processes regulate
information flow between the stores. The rehearsal buffer model is a subpart of this theory. Experi mental manipulations included all of the main verbal learning techniques.
4 . Levels of Proces sing - Craik & Lockhart (1972)

[LEVELS]

Levels of processing was proposed as an alternative framework to two - store theories.
Our memory
for an object or event is viewed as a byproduct of the various processing performed upon it . The
formulation of the framework rests largely upon common intuitions about the depth of processing required by different tasks.
5. Kintsch (1974)
[KINTSCH]
Kintsch's theory represents text as a list of atomic propositions. The organization of the test
is captured by the overlap of propositional elements. His early experiments tested various reading
time and memory predictions of his theory.
Hi s later work (e .g., Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978) presents
a mathematical model for comprehension and memory of texts.
6. ELINOR - Norman, Rumelhart, & LNR (1975)

[LNR]

Their model contains a network representation, but it emphasizes representations of procedures,
called active structural networks.
These structures have a case-like quality and use semantic primitives in order to represent relations between ve rbs. Analy ses have been applied to a wide variety of
tasks, but most analyses related to memory use a short set of materials.

7. Paivio's (1971) Dual Code Theory

[PAIVIO]

Pa i v io argued that v erbal and figural information have separate memory structures, which are
independent but partially interconnected. Typical tests employ paired-associate learning and various
memory measures for single words and pictures.
8. SAM - Raaijmakers & Shiffrin (1980, 1981)

[SAM]

SAM is a theory of probabilistic search of associative networks with varying strengths of
connections. The retrieval processes are modeled mathematically and have been applied to free recall,
paired- associate recall, and recognition paradigms.
9. Ratcliff's (1978) Theory of Memory Retrieval

[RATCLIFF]

Ratcliff's t heor y of retrieval uses a resonance metaphor.
Probe items evoke, in parallel, evidence
from related items, wh ich is accumulated i n random walk comparison processe s . The mathematical model
incorporates sev eral response mea sures and has been applied to item recognition paradigms.
10. SCHEMA - Rumelhart & Ortony (1977)

[SCHEMA]

"Schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. They exist
for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and
sequences of actions," (p. 101) and are of primary importance in comprehension.
Schemata have
var iables, can be embedded, and can va ry in their level of abstraction and represent knowledge.
[MOPS]

11. MOPS - Schank (1980)

Schank has proposed MOPS as a flexible version of scripts. MOPS are "memory organizations packets"
that are used in understanding and storing the experiences that we have.
They provide an organization
of the relevant episodes.
In addition to theoretical discu ssion, MOP-like structures have been used
in computer simulations of event understanding .
12. Tulving (1972, 1975; Tulving

&

Thomson, 1973)

[TULVING]

Tulving has an identifiable orientation towards memory that runs throughout his many publications.
Some salie nt aspects of his orien tation are the encoding specificity principle and the semant icepisodic distinction. Tulving generally strives to present general principles rather than formal
models. Most of the experimental work used list s of words or paired-associates and measures, recognition, recall, or cued recall. (Mo st of the subjects were not familiar with the Flexser and Tulving
[1978] paper in which a mo re formal account of recognition failures of recallable words is given.)
N
01
-...J
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FIG. 7.1. SINDSCAL solution in
two dimensions using the two group
matrices.
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Clustering. In addition to these scalings, a variety of MAPCLUS and INDCLUS solutions were generated. We focus on the groups and overall totals. As
with the question of ideal number of dimensions, the procedure for choosing the
"correct" number of clusters is not well-specified, but an examination of a large
number of solutions between 3 and 8 clusters convinced us that 5 was the best
solution. The variance accounted for increased quite a bit from using just 4
clusters , and did not increase much when we used 6 clusters. In addition, the
interpretability of these solutions was good. When groups were used in the
INDCLUS procedure, there was usually perfect agreement between the two
groups on the order in which to weight the five clusters . However, different runs,
with different random starts, seemed to provide quite different solutions. We
found that the MAPCLUS solutions were more similar to each other. Because the
groups showed only minor differences in their weights of the various clusters, we
focus on the MAPCLUS solution. Table 7.2 contains a MAPCLUS solution that
accounted for . 813 of the variance . In considering each of these clusters , we will
also provide information about the other solutions (generated with different
initial configurations) to help interpretability. The most weighted cluster in this
solution (HAM, KINTSCH, LNR, SCHEMA, MOPS), often emerged as the
most heavily weighted cluster in a large number of MAPCLUS and INDCLUS
solutions, even when the solutions used different numbers of clusters. These five
theories have a number of similar characteristics. As mentioned earlier, they use
the largest units of analysis. In addition, they are all symbol-processing models .

.8
2
.6

2 1
1

.4

2

.2
.00

.2

.4

.6

.8

FIG. 7.2. Subject space from the
two-dimensional SINDSCAL so lution when all often individual subjects are used. Number indicates
whether fro first or second group .
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TABLE 7.2
MAPCLUS So luti on for Five Cl usters (VAF

Weight
(1)

(2)
(3 )
(4 )
(5 )

.4447
.4091
.2308
.2162
.1743

=
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. 813)

Cluster
HAM KINTSCH LNR SCHEMA ~10PS
VECTOR SAM RATCLIFF
HAM A&S LNR SAM RATCLIFF TULVING
LEVELS SCHEMA MOPS TULVING
HAM A&S LEVELS KINTSCH PAIVIO SAM TULVING

That is, they all view the memory trace as highly structured, with the structure
related to the meaning of the trace (propositions, cases). The second cluster,
VECTOR, SAM, and RATCLIFF, also appears in most solutions. These three
theories have strong mathematical formulations.
The third cluster in Fig. 7.3 varied with different solutions. While it usually
contains HAM, A&S, SAM and RATCLIFF, three other theories (LNR ,
KINTSCH, and TULVING) are sometimes included and sometimes not. The
interpretation of this cluster is difficult, because it depends on which of these
theories is "really" in the cluster. In some ways, it appears to be excluding the
extremes: of units (SCHEMA and MOPS), and of formality (VECTOR at one
end, LEVELS and PAIVIO at the other).
The fourth cluster (LEVELS, SCHEMA , MOPS, TULVING) appears in most
solutions, though it is not usually weighted very heavily. While the interpretation
is arguable, they all appear to be popular theories that have clear general ideas,
but rather vague specifics. That is, they all serve as types of frameworks.
The fifth cluster occurs in a large proportion of the solutions, though often it
also contains LNR. It appears also to be including a middle portion of the
theories, by excluding extremes of units (SCHEMA and MOPS) and formality
(VECTOR and RATCLIFF) .

Minkowski -metric. In the last section , we discussed the use of metrics other
than the Euclidean metric (r = 2) and claimed that a consideration of different
processing possibilities through an examination of different metrics is an important and often neglected use of scaling. With the memory theories data, it is clear
that these theories are richly represented in the minds of researchers , but it is not
clear how even the major aspects' similarities and differences are used to arrive
at a rating. To provide an example of Arnold's procedure , we fit the city-block
(r = I) and dominance (r = infinity, approximated by 32) metrics by starting with
the Euclidean configuration. As we mentioned earlier, this procedure works
well, but appears to have trouble with two-dimensional solutions . However, our
preferred solution was in two dimensions , so we have compared Arnold 's procedure with 24 random starts in both metrics .
Let us first consider the dominance metric , in which the distance between two
objects is the maximum distance on any dimension. As SINDSCAL (or its
progenitor, INDSCAL) does not allow Minkowski metrics other than 2, we used
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KYST for this analysis. We found a good KYST solution (simi lar to Fig. 7 . 1) and
used it as a starting configuration for r=3, then used this solution as a starting
configuration for r=4, then go ing to 8, 16 , and 32 . The stress (formula I) declined
from 2 to 16 and then stayed level to 32 . (The stress values were . 100, .092 , .088 ,
.083, .081, and .08 1 for r's of 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, and 32, respectively). The 24
random configurations used as starts for r= 32 did not fare nearly as well as the
stress of .08 1 found through Arnold's procedure. The smallest was .091, but only
4 were below. 100, and 17 were above .200.
The dominance metric solution is given in Fig. 7.3. Although the purpose of
this paper does not allow a lengthy discussion, a brief examination may be useful
for understanding the insights gained through the use of other metrics. Overall,
the solution is similar to the one in Fig. 7.1 (the SINDSCAL by groups with
r=2). The Y-axis appears to be related to the formality of the theory. The X-axis
is somewhat different from the earlier solution , but for reasons to be mentioned
shortly , seems to be well interpreted as before as dealing with the unit of
analysis. A second point to mention before discussing specifics, is that both axes
are stretched relative to the earlier solution . The Y-axis in particular has a much
greater range and appears to be the more important of the two dimensions.
In examining Fig. 7.3, the most striking result is how VECTOR is clearly set
apart. With the Euclidean solution, the fact that VECTOR was viewed as different from all the other theories was taken care of by making it a little more
extreme on both dimensions. With the dominance metric, we see that VECTOR
is set apart on the formality dimension; in every pair involving VECTOR, this
dimension has the greater distance. Given this placement, its location on the

• VECTOR

1.5

1.0

_RATCLIFF

.5
_HAM

eA & S

_LNR

-1.0

-.5

.5

-

1.0

KINTSCH

-MOPS

-SCHEMA

-.5
_TULVING

- 1.0
• LEV ELS

- 1.5

-

PAIVIO

FIG. 7.3. Dominance metric twodimensional solution lIsing KYST.
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other dimension is inconsequential. (In fact, it is likely that its X-coordinate is
due to its similarity to RATCLIFF, which in turn is most simi lar to SAM then
HAM, so may have needed to be intermediate .) This major determination by the
Y -axis is true to a somewhat lesser extent of RATCLIFF and LEVELS (and to an
even lesser extent to PAIVIO , which is extreme on both dimensions). We believe
the heavy use of the Y-axis by these theories is what accounts for some of the
differences on the X-ax is with the earlier solution , as just mentioned for VECTOR. As another example, in order to satisfy all the pairwise constraints , the
Fig. 7. I solution has KINTSCH as less formal than SCHEMA or MOPS, when
our feeling is that most of the subjects would view it as more formal. The
solution of Fig. 7.3 does have KINTSCH as more formal than the other two
theories, although it differs from these two theories more on level of unit than
formality. We view this result as more satisfactory.
The results for the city-block metric, in which the distance between the two
points is the sum of the distances along the dimensions, is not quite so straightforward . Starting with a configuration from a Euclidean solution , we went to rs
of 1.5, 1.25 and then 1.0 with corresponding stress values of . 100 , .091, .085,
and .093. Although the stress with 1'< 2 was slightly less than with 1'=2, this
decrease was not monotonic. We tried this sequence several times and variations
of it several more times and always found this non-monotonicity. A second
problem occurred when considering the results from the 24 random starting
configurations. Two of these solutions had stress of .071, although the solutions
were uninterpretable to us. Of the other 22 solutions, none was below . 10 and 18
were above .20. The solution for 1'= 1 with stress of .093 is very simi lar to the
r= 32 solution given in Fig. 7 .3. From a visual inspection, the only obvious
difference is that TULVING is closer to A&S on both dimensions in the cityblock solution .

Summary. As we stated when starting this section , although we hoped to
provide some information about the organization of the theories, the principal
goal was to illustrate the techniques. From a technical perspective , there are two
often neglected procedures that we hope will be used more . First, an important
use of these techniques may be to compare groups on their representations and
weightings. While our groups showed few differences , we hope the reasoning
and procedures were clear. Second, we suggested that the use of other metrics
should be considered and we tried to show the additional information that they
can provide. In terms of how cognitive psychologists (or a small group of them)
view memory theories, two further points may be made. One , degree of formality and level of analysis unit appear to be important dimensions. Two , these
features are correlated in that theories with high forma lity often involve mathematical treatments and small units , theories with intermediate formality often
involve symbol-processing and large units , while theories of low formality are
often concerned with characterizing general principles and use intermediatesized units .
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THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF MDS FOR
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
In its most straightforward applications, MDS analysis provides us with some
ideas about the underlying structure of a domain. Most of the applications that
are widely known are fairly simple domains, from a cognitive perspective, such
as the Miller-Nicely data on consonant phonemes, or the color circle, or the more
recent work on musical tones. However, we have also seen a tendency to deal
with more complex phenomena such as semantic categories, prose passages , and
musical passages as well. This extension to more complex domains suggests that
we have not yet reached the limit where MDS and related procedures become
useless . However, it does appear that MDS is able to recover dimensions only
when the stimuli have something in common. Although such a point may seem
obvious, it is worth mentioning explicitly that the scaling of heterogeneous
stimuli is probably not going to be terribly informative. For example, Arnold
(1971) scaled a set of unrelated words and recovered the dimensions of the
semantic differential: evaluation, potency , and activation. We suspect that the
reason these connotative aspects of meaning emerged as the dimensions is that
there were no denotative dimensions on which one could order the widely varying terms that Arnold investigated .
Although MDS and related procedure can clearly make an important contribution to our understanding of a structure of a domain, it is less clear what these
procedures can offer in terms of an understanding of the process . Strictly speaking, MDS tells us nothing about the way in which the stimuli of a domain are
processed. In terms of semantic categories, for example, these procedures provide no guidance on whether the concepts in a space are related because of
connecting pathways in a semantic network or because of overlapping features.
Thus, the kind of fundamental problem that is facing cognitive psychology and
that we discussed at the outset of this chapter, is unlikely to be solved by a wider
application of MDS. It is not clear to us, for example, how MDS could solve the
debate over semantic memory models or the propositional-imagery debate
generally.
Although the applicability of MDS to processing questions is far less than its
applicability to structural questions , MDS can help, usually indirectly , with
processing issues. Perhaps the best example of such assistance is the processing
model developed by Rumelhart and Abrahamsen (1973) . By invoking some
additional assumptions (most notably Luce's choice axiom and an exponential
transformation) they were able to come up with a sophisticated processing account of analogical reasoning in a particular domain. Less dramatically , Shoben
(1976) developed a processing account of the same-different task (as applied to
categorization) that was derived from his multidimensional scaling of the stimulus items .
Perhaps the most general way in which to view MDS procedures in the
context of cognitive psychology is in terms of constraint. In our introductory
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remarks, we mentioned the difficulty in distinguishing between dual-store and
unitary accounts of the semantic/episodic dispute. The data, at present, seem not
terribly constraining in that results that are interpreted as support for one position
are quite readily reinterpreted as supporting the opposite view. In some respects,
this outcome is a natural course of the progression of science. Its logical conclusion, however, is that we need as much constraint on the domain we are studying
as we can possibly get. MDS and related procedures are clearly capable of
providing constraint and they are therefore of considerable use to cognitive
psychology .
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